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ABSTRACT 
Taxation and Market Power    
by Kai A. Konrad, Florian Morath and Wieland Müller * 
We analyze the incidence and welfare effects of unit sales taxes in experimental 
monopoly and Bertrand markets. We find, in line with economic theory, that 
firms with no market power are able to shift a high share of a tax burden on to 
consumers, independent of whether buyers are automated or human players. In 
monopoly markets, a monopolist bears a large share of the burden of a tax 
increase. With human buyers, however, this share is smaller than with 
automated buyers as the presence of human buyers constrains the pricing 
behavior of a monopolist. 
 
Keywords: Tax incidence, monopoly, Bertrand competition, experiment 
 
JEL classification: H22, L12, L13, C72, C92 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Besteuerung und Marktmacht  
Dieser Artikel untersucht Inzidenz- und Wohlfahrtseffekte einer Mengensteuer 
in experimentellen Monopol- und Bertrand-Märkten. Im Einklang mit der ökono-
mischen Theorie sind Firmen ohne Marktmacht in der Lage, einen großen Anteil 
der Last einer Steuererhöhung an die Konsumenten weiterzugeben. Dies gilt 
unabhängig davon, ob die Käufer simuliert sind oder die Kaufentscheidungen 
durch reale Käufer getroffen werden. In Monopolmärkten trägt der Monopolist 
einen großen Anteil der Last einer Steuererhöhung. Werden die 
Kaufentscheidungen durch reale Käufer getroffen, ist dieser Anteil jedoch 
kleiner als mit simulierten Käufern, da reale Käufer im Experiment das Preis-
setzungsverhalten des Monopolisten einschränken.   
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1 Introduction
The economic incidence e¤ects of taxation in the context of markets is a core issue in public nance.
Who bears the economic burden of a specic tax has implications for policy-makers and for the
political economy of taxation. The analysis of the tax-induced economic burden as a function of
market conditions and market power has, hence, attracted considerable attention in the theory of
taxation.1 Yet there is a discrepancy between the predictions of standard economic theory and
the public opinion on the impact of market power on the burden of a tax (as illustrated below).
Moreover, empirical studies of tax incidence in specic markets have lead to mixed results. In
this paper we provide experimental evidence on the role of market power for the incidence e¤ects
and welfare e¤ects of taxation. We compare the incidence e¤ects of a unit sales tax for the case
of monopoly with Bertrand competition, allowing for two di¤erent regimes regarding consumers
decision making.
Textbook theory suggests that monopoly rms typically bear a large share of the burden
of an increase in sales taxes, whereas rms with little or no market power can often shift all of
the additional tax burden to the buyers (Myles 1995, 358-363). Intuitively, Bertrand competition
between rms without market power should make prices fall to the point of zero prots. Thus, with
Bertrand competition for homogenous products, rms cannot bear the burden of an additional tax.
If their unit cost of production is increased by a tax, either they can shift the burden of this tax
to the buyers, or they must exit the market (Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002, p. 1824). In contrast,
monopolists choose monopoly prices in the absence of taxation, maximizing their monopoly prots.
If they have to pay a unit tax on sales, the monopoly prot can potentially serve as a bu¤er that
enables them to absorb this cost shock. The monopolist may adjust the price in line with the
marginal-cost-equals-marginal-revenue calculation. Depending on the demand and the marginal
cost curve, this may cause an increase in the monopoly price by less or more than the amount of
the tax, and the cost increase will hurt the monopolist strongly (Bishop 1968).2
The incidence of a specic tax has also become the focus of much empirical research. Studies
1See Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) for a detailed survey.
2Theoretical considerations are less straightforward for imperfect competition with more than one rm. Seade
(1985) and Stern (1987) showed that rms may shift more than the total increase in their unit costs onwards to
customers in di¤erent frameworks with imperfect competition. Collusion and its break-down, entry and exit decisions,
combined with a non-linear cost structure and specicities of the demand function may play a role. Hamilton (2008)
highlights the importance of multiproduct markets.
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of specic markets nd a large variety of pass-through rates of taxes both for Bertrand competition
and for imperfect competition.3 Moreover, the question of pass-through of cost increases whether
tax induced or not is a key question for practitioners in capital markets, and the perceptions
articulated by practitioners and non-economists are often in contrast with the theory predictions of
tax incidence theory. The nancial newspaper Financial Times Deutschland, citing a UBS research
paper, analyzes investment strategies in times of cost ination. The author of the article argues
that investors should seek rms with much market power. Global equity research at UBS by Nelson
(2008) recommends the purchase of price makersto deal with cost ination, and a paper about
pricing power by Exane BNP Paribas (p.11) states that they expect rms with genuine pricing
power to outperform the market in times with cost ination. They identify three channels for
pricing power to help in an environment with increasing cost. One of these is a type of monopoly
power (see page 11):
Brands are used by companies to allow them to charge premium prices. When prices
rise, customer loyalty means that there will be a limited impact on demand. Even if a
lower-price product is available, especially if the product does not represent a signicant
proportion of a consumer budget, the brand-loyal customer will pay up. This means
that it may be possible to preserve margins in an inationary environment.
This perception may be contrasted with the theorys point of view: monopolists should have already
used an existing range for price increases, rather than wait for a cost shock before using the available
opportunities for prot maximization.
3Seade (1985) gave as motivation for his theoretical analysis the successful cost-shifting by large multinational oil
companies during the rst oil crisis. Kim and Cotterill (2008) nd pass-through rates of 21-31 percent under collusion
and between 73 and 103 percent under Bertrand competition for a market with di¤erentiated brands. Studies by
Devereux and Lanot (2003) and Chouinard and Perlo¤ (2004) show a pass-through in the interior between 0 and 100
percent for mortgages and gasoline taxes, respectively. Poterba (1996) considers the markets for clothing, essentially
conrming the theoretical predictions about a 100 percent pass-through of taxes in competitive markets. Besley and
Rosen (1999) consider prices in di¤erent locations which apply di¤erent sales taxes and nd that, in line with the
competitive markets theory, the higher taxes are fully passed through. For some products, however, they nd prices
that are substantially higher than for a full pass-through. For instance, for alcohol taxes, pass through rates above
100 percent occur more frequently. Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2002) nds evidence suggesting that excise taxes
on alcohol increase the price of alcohol by three times the amount of the excise tax increase. Kenkel (2005) shows
that increases in per-unit taxes on alcoholic beverages were more than fully passed through to consumers in Alaska
and surveys other studies for several di¤erent markets.
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The divergence between practitioners perceptions and theory predictions, and the het-
erogenous empirical results together with the multiplicity of di¤erent possible factors causing these
pass-through rates highlight the importance of studying the tax incidence e¤ect of market power
in an experimental framework that makes it possible to isolate the e¤ect of market power which
pertains to the theoretical considerations. For this purpose we analyze the equilibrium reactions to
a unit sales-tax increase for both a monopoly market and for a Bertrand market for homogenous
products. We derive theory predictions for the specic market framework and consider which of
the theory predictions is in line with the observed behavior in the experiment. In order to be
able to distinguish between pure supply-side e¤ects (monopoly versus competition) and the role of
strategic interaction between buyers and sellers (automated buyers versus truly human decision-
makers) we consider two di¤erent demand regimes. For one market regime rms know that they
sell their goods to a market with automated demand that emulates customers behaving in line with
textbook economics. In this context, sellers do not face any uncertainty about the buyersreac-
tions to market prices. We nd that Bertrand competition in the experimental market is in perfect
conformity with textbook economics: Bertrand competitors fully pass through the tax increase to
their customers. For the monopoly equilibrium with automated demand, the empirical outcome is
also close to the textbook prediction. We then consider the same monopoly and Bertrand setups
with buyers who are not automated but real human customers whose purchasing decisions may,
but need not necessarily, coincide with the predictions of standard consumer theory. We nd that
Bertrand competitors who are dealing with (and know they are dealing with) real customers are
also successful in passing through their full tax-induced cost increases to the buyers, similar to
the results with automated demand. Major deviations from the textbook predictions occur for the
monopoly with real human buyers. Monopolists who know they o¤er their goods to real players
do not achieve the monopoly price as an equilibrium outcome even before the tax increase. Also
not all buyers follow their pure material interests. Some refuse to buy if the price is too close to
their (laboratory-induced) monetary valuation. The increase in the monopolists cost increases the
equilibrium price; however, the increase is less than half the size of the tax-induced increase in the
monopolists cost. Hence, the monopolist is able to shift a smaller share of the cost increase onward
to the buyers, somewhat in contrast to the predictions of textbook monopoly pricing. However,
even in the setting with individual buyers as decision makers on the demand side, the monopolist
bears a large share of the tax burden.
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Few earlier studies considered taxes in experimental markets4, and even fewer experiments
on tax incidence have been carried out. None of these studies considered the role of market power.
Kerschbamer and Kirchsteiger (2000), Kachelmeier et al. (1994), Borck et al. (2002), Riedl and
Tyran (2005) and Ru­ e (2005) study the relationship between statutory and economic incidence:
whether the statutory rule about who physically delivers the tax to the tax authorities a¤ects the
incidence of the tax. All of these studies keep the market institution and the nature of demand
constant. Quirmbach et al. (1996), addressing the incidence of corporate taxation in a simple
Harberger-type general equilibrium game, nd that capital owners are able to shift some share of
the burden of capital taxation. However, their experiment does not make it possible to address
the relationship between market power and tax incidence. In contrast, we ask what the role of
market power is for tax shifting and for the size of the excess burden, and how this result depends
on whether the demand side consists of real buyers as decision-makers. This fundamental role of
market structure for tax incidence and the excess burden of taxation has received surprisingly little
attention in experimental work.
We use a simple framework that enables us to make strong and straightforward predictions
about tax incidence. This framework is described in section 2. Testable hypotheses about the
incidence and welfare properties of the unit sales tax as a function of market structure are developed
in section 3. Section 4 describes the experimental design and explains these choices, discussing how
our experimental design relates to the experimental markets literature, as our analysis builds upon
experience on experimental market games.5 Section 5 contains the experimental results on tax
incidence and welfare and section 6 concludes.
2 Tax incidence with block demand
We consider a market for a single homogeneous good. The good is produced by n rms, where n = 1
refers to the monopoly case and n = 4 involves competition, and the good is sold to m = 4 buyers.
Each rm can produce units of this good for a constant unit cost equal to c = 6:5. In addition, for
each unit sold, the rm needs to pay a unit sales tax equal to t 2 f2; 6g, causing tax-inclusive total
4 Incentive e¤ects of taxes have been studied in the context of labour leisure choices (see, e.g., Sillamaa 1999, Sutter
and Weck-Hannemann 2003, Ortona et al. 2008, Levy-Garboua et al. 2009). The role of taxes for the performance
of markets has also received some attention. Bloomeld et al. (2009) analyze the role of transaction taxes for trade
in nancial markets with informed and noise traders, and nd that they a¤ect both types of traders similarly.
5The literature is surveyed, e.g., by Plott (1989) and Holt (1995).
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unit cost of production of c+t. Each rm i chooses a price pi 2 N. We consider a nite grid of prices
that maps the nite grid of prices that exists in real markets, due to currency indivisibilities. It also
has the practical benet of making the pricing equilibrium unique, and avoids open-set problems
regarding optimal choice.6 At price pi, the rm i is willing to produce and sell as many units as are
demanded. A simple price revelation mechanism matches rms and buyers together: the market
mechanism identies the lowest o¤er price and announces this o¤er price to the buyers. Buyers
observe the lowest o¤er price and decide whether to purchase one unit of the homogeneous good
at this price. A buyer either purchases exactly one unit, or does not buy at all. All buyers forward
the units they purchase to the laboratory and receive q = 24:5 laboratory currency units per unit
of the good. We call this price the (laboratory-induced) monetary valuation. If several rms o¤er
the good at the same lowest price, the number of units demanded is assumed to be allocated evenly
among the sellers.
If all sellers and buyers maximize their monetary payo¤s, this game has a unique Nash
equilibrium for each of the di¤erent parameter values (n; t) 2 f(1; 2); (1; 6); (4; 2); (4; 6)g. For n = 1
the seller is a monopolist facing a block demand of four units. The prot-maximizing integer price
p1 is 24, yielding a prot that is equal to M = 64 for t = 2 and M = 48 for t = 6. Consumer rent
for each buyer is equal to 0:5 for both values of the unit tax. This market equilibrium is e¢ cient.
The tax does not distort the allocation, and it does not generate an excess burden in the market.
Further, the higher tax causes an increase in the tax revenue from TR(t=2) = 8 to TR(t=6) = 24.
At the same time, the monopoly prot falls from 64 to 48, a decrease of precisely the same size as
the increase in the tax revenue. This determines the tax incidence: the increase in the sales tax is
fully borne by the monopolist.
Turning to the cases of Bertrand competition, (n; t) 2 f(4; 2); (4; 6)g, the Nash equilibrium
in prices has pi = p = 9 for all i = 1; 2; 3; 4 if t = 2, and pi = p = 13 if t = 6. As a result, each
buyer purchases one unit and each rm sells one unit at the equilibrium price. Each seller makes
a prot equal to 0:5 for both levels of taxes. Each buyer has a consumer rent of 24:5  p, which is
equal to 15:5 for t = 2 and equal to 11:5 for t = 6. Accordingly, for the Bertrand market the loss
in the aggregate sum of producer and consumer rents is again equal to the tax revenue from the
increased sales tax. Moreover, the tax is fully borne by the buyers. Bertrand competitors can fully
shift the burden of taxes onwards to the buyers.
These results illustrate a cornerstone of partial analytic theory of tax incidence: with block
6For a discussion of the role of a smallest unit for Bertrand equilibrium see Hehenkamp and Leininger (1999).
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demand, a monopolist bears the burden of higher taxes, whereas sellers with no market power
can pass this burden through to their customers. The experiments can reveal whether these fun-
damental results do materialize, and which additional e¤ects are present. One set of treatments
compares monopoly and Bertrand competition, isolating supply e¤ects by replacing real demand
by automated demand, which makes the demand behavior for di¤erent prices fully predictable for
suppliers. A second set of treatments adds demand decisions by real individuals. This introduces
a potentially important element of strategic uncertainty. Sellers must form expectations about
purchase decisions of buyers. Sellers know that buyers are paid 24:5 for each unit of the good that
they purchase. However, whether buyers actually buy at a given smallest observed price is another
matter. An implicit assumption in the textbook analysis is that buyers purchase if and only if
their (externally induced) monetary valuation of the good is higher than the o¤er price. If real
individuals make the purchasing decisions, their actual net benet from the purchase decision may
deviate from the externally induced monetary valuation. Assume, for instance, that buyers con-
sider the monopoly situation similar to an ultimatum game: by suggesting a price, the monopolist
o¤ers the buyer a piece of the pie. The buyer then has to accept or refuse this o¤er. The theory
of ultimatum games generated a wealth of evidence for why we should not expect an outcome in
which the monopolist charges 24, but a smaller price, and why some buyers may reject prices of
24 or lower. Many of these theories t well with the idea that buyers are heterogenous in their
boycott behavior. Let, for instance, F (p) be the share of buyers who accept all prices lower than
or equal to p. The monopolist then simply faces an uncertain demand function, where the size of
the demand at a given price is mF (p); where m is the number of units sold.
3 Theoretical predictions
The hypotheses focus on how market power a¤ects the ability of sellers to shift the tax burden
onwards to buyers, and whether human decision-making on the buyers side plays a role. We
expect the strategic uncertainty generated by human buyersdecision-making to play a key role.
The rst conjecture, stated as a testable hypothesis, addresses the case with automated demand:
Hypothesis 1 In the absence of strategic demand uncertainty (i.e., with automated demand),
Bertrand competitors can fully pass on the burden of a tax increase to the buyers. A monopo-
list cannot pass on the burden of taxation to its buyers. The monopolist bears the full burden of an
additional tax.
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Human buyers may, but need not purchase a good (i.e., boycott) if the o¤er price is below
their benet in monetary terms if they do purchase the good. We expect buyers to be more likely
to boycott if
(a) the monetary rent they sacrice by their refusal to purchase is small, or
(b) the price o¤er they face gives them a small share in the overall rent that has to be
shared between the seller(s) and the buyers.
These conjectures are in line with a number of behavioral considerations (fairness, inequality
aversion, an educational mission to punish players who deviate from socially acceptable equity
norms, a simple heuristic suggesting not to accept deals that are too asymmetric, etc.).
We use (a) and (b) to form hypotheses about the two treatments with real (human) buyers.
Consider rst Bertrand competition. In the textbook equilibrium the market price drops to the
price closest to the sellerstax-inclusive costs. A sellers fear of possible boycott cannot reasonably
drive down the price further than that. Boycott considerations should therefore not play a role for
Bertrand competition. The empirical Bertrand game outcomes for automated and human buyers
should not systematically di¤er. Bertrand competitors should be able to shift the burden of taxes
onwards to the buyers also if these are human buyers. For the monopoly case, the boycott option of
human buyers can make a di¤erence. The monopolist charges a price close to the buyersmonetary
valuation for the case of automated buyers. This leaves almost no rent for a buyer if he purchases
at this price, and it leads to a very uneven distribution of the total rent of the transaction, with
almost all rent appropriated by the monopolist. The motivations in (a) and (b) for boycott may
both be relevant and cause strategic uncertainty: this may induce monopolists to charge less than
the price that is closest to the buyersmonetary valuation. An increase in the tax may then have
an impact on the pricing behavior, as it a¤ects the distribution of rents. The testable hypotheses
resulting from this are:
Hypothesis 2 With demand choices made by real individuals, Bertrand competitors can pass on
the entire burden of a tax increase. A monopolist can pass on a signicant part of the tax increase
to the buyers.
Boycott is a possible source of ine¢ ciency: if a purchase does not take place, the value
between production cost and the buyersinduced monetary valuation will be lost. If Hypothesis 2
holds, buyersboycott does not play a big role in Bertrand markets and the e¢ ciency of Bertrand
markets is high even with real buyers. Boycott may become an issue in the monopoly case. We
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expect:
Hypothesis 3 For real buyers in a monopoly market, the observed demand di¤ers from block
demand and is downward-sloping for a range of prices that is smaller than the monetary gross
benet from purchasing the good.
We can use the observed demand decisions in the experiment to estimate this (potentially)
downward-sloping demand pattern and ask whether, and to what extent, the monopolists pricing
pattern is a prot-maximizing reply to this demand pattern. In a purely static framework, a buyer
knows c+ t and the monetary valuation r. Facing a market price o¤er of p, the buyer must decide
whether to purchase a unit or to boycott. Given the considerations on (a) and (b) above, buyers
may have a threshold price, and di¤erent buyers may purchase if and only if the price is not higher
than their respective threshold price. This threshold need not be the same for all buyers. This
generates a cumulative distribution function F (p) describing the share of buyers purchasing a unit
of the good for each possible o¤er price . If the monopolist knows the probability distribution F (p)
and wishes to maximize his monetary payo¤, his expected payo¤ is equal to
(p  c  t)F (p)m (1)
where m is the number of buyers. The strategic multi-period problem is potentially more com-
plicated. The monopolist may have a prior belief about F (p). The monopolist may also try and
experiment in order to nd out about what types of buyers he was matched with. The buyers may,
therefore, act strategically when making their choices in early rounds. This latter motivation for
each single buyer is absent if the number of buyers is large, because each buyer then considers his
own inuence on the probability update of the monopolist as insignicant. Making the somewhat
strong assumption here that four buyers are a big number and each of them feels atomistic, this
eliminates the incentive of strategic purchasing behavior and simplies the problem. The monopo-
list can then use the buyersdecisions in the rst N   1 rounds to nd an estimate about F (p) and
choose a price in the last round that maximizes the expected prot that emerges from this estimate
about F (p). We consider the following
Hypothesis 4 In the last round the monopolist chooses p to maximize (p   c   t)F (p)m, where
F (p) is the monopolists posterior belief about the share of buyers who purchase the good if the price
is not higher than p, and where the monopolist uses buying decisions in previous rounds to update
his beliefs about F (p).
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The boycott behavior of real buyers and pricing of rms has welfare implications. If the
conjectures about Bertrand competition are correct, then the imposition of a unit sales tax does
not generate an excess burden in a framework with block demand. For the monopoly case, in the
absence of strategic buyer uncertainty, the monopolist should earn a rent equal to m (24  c  t)
and the sum of buyersmonetary payo¤s should be equal to 0:5m. Due to buyersboycott and
monopolistspricing choices, the expected payo¤s are F (p)m(p c  t), and the monopolist chooses
the p(t) maximizing this expression. A buyers monetary payo¤ is F (p)(24:5   p) for this prot-
maximizing price. The tax revenue is tF (p)m. The excess burden (dened as the total sacrice
in monetary payo¤s of the seller, the buyers and the government compared to transactions that
maximize this monetary sum) can be described as
[1  F (p(t))]m(24:5  c): (2)
Hypothesis 5 The monopoly outcome with real buyers is characterized by a strictly positive excess
burden. The Bertrand markets and the monopoly with automated demand are e¢ cient.
It is interesting to ask whether the welfare loss in the monopoly case with real buyers
increases or decreases if the tax rate is higher. With boycott considerations being absent, both
tax rates t 2 f2; 6g should yield an e¢ cient outcome in which four units are sold. With boycott
considerations several countervailing e¤ects can be at work. First, if the unit sales tax is increased,
this may change the maximum price that a buyer may be willing to accept. One natural conjecture
would be that the observed increase in the sellers tax-inclusive unit cost may make a buyer more
inclined to accept a given price. As this may be conjectured by the monopolists as well, they may
also charge a higher price in this case, leaving it open whether the increase in the tax causes an
increase or a decrease in transactions. Second, the increase in the unit tax narrows the range in
which possible mutually benecial transactions can take place from the set of prices f9; 10; ::; 24g
to the set f13; 14; :::; 24g, which in turn may reduce the boycott problem. To see this, consider the
extreme with t = 17. For this tax, the set of prices yielding a positive monetary payo¤ for the
monopolist and for the buyers has only one element: p = 24. We would expect that, for t = 17,
buyers do not boycott at a price of p = 24. Hence, narrowing down the range of mutually protable
transaction prices may enhance e¢ ciency. There may also be a negative e¤ect of narrowing down
the range of mutually protable transaction prices. As suggested by the theory of Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983), e¢ ciency of bargaining under mutually asymmetric information can be taken
for granted only if a sellers range of possible reservation prices and the buyers range of possible
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willingness to pay are su¢ ciently disjoint (in a sense that need not be made more precise here). The
increase in the sellers reservation price narrows the gap between the monetary parts of the sellers
reservation price and buyersmonetary valuation. The actual reservation prices of the seller and the
buyers may be obtained from these monetary values by adding a random component that reects,
for instance, their willingness to sanction violations of their (unobserved) norms. Each buyers true
reservation price becomes a random variable. If this random variable is not altered by the increase
in the sellers actual tax including production cost, bargaining theory suggests that the narrowing of
the range of mutually protable prices may reduce the ex-post e¢ ciency of transactions. However,
the rent that buyers demand for refraining from boycott need not be independent of m   (c + t),
making the direction of this e¤ect less clear-cut.
Quantitatively, the change in the excess burden, or welfare loss, is
[F (p(2))  F (p(6))]m(24:5  c); (3)
the change in the total burden for the monopolist is
F (p(2))m(p(2)  c  2)  F (p(6))m(p(6)  c  6) (4)
and the change in the burden for the buyers is
F (p(2))m(24:5  p(2))  F (p(6))m(24:5  p(6)). (5)
As discussed, a theoretical prediction about the sign of these terms cannot be made, due to the
conjectures about several partially countervailing e¤ects.
We now describe the experiment and then turn to the results, contrasting the outcomes
with the theoretical considerations.
4 Experimental design, procedures, and related literature
Experimental design and procedures. Our experiment is based on a 22 factorial
design, varying market power of rms on the supply side (monopoly vs. oligopoly), and distinguish-
ing between simulated and real (that is, human) buyers on the demand side of a market. All sellers
in our treatments are human decision -makers. We refer to the four treatments as follows. The
monopoly treatment with simulated buyers is called MonSim,whereas the monopoly treatment
with real buyers is called MonReal. Similarly, the oligopoly treatment with Bertrand price
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competition and simulated demand is called BertSim,whereas the Bertrand market with real
buyers is called BertReal.
In the instructions,7 we used a non-neutral frame, with rms being referred to as sellers
and consumers being referred to as buyers.Subjects were informed that the experiment would
consist of two parts and that they would rst only be informed about the rules in the rst part
of the experiment. Only after completion of the rst part were subjects informed about the rules
of the second part. Each part of the experiment consisted of 10 decision rounds. Earnings in the
experiment were measured in pointswhich, at the end of the experiment, were converted into
real money (see below). In the following we describe the setting in each of the four treatments.
MonSim Treatment : On the supply side, there is one monopolist seller who o¤ers to sell
up to four units of a good in the market. On the demand side, there are four simulated buyers, each
willing to buy one unit of the good and who have a monetary valuation for this unit of 24.5. At the
beginning of each period the seller chooses a price (a non-negative integer) at which he would be
willing to satisfy the demand of up to 4 units of the good. Sellers were informed that each of the
four simulated buyers per market would then (independently) buy a unit of the good if and only if
the price is not higher than 24.5. At the end of a period, the monopolist was informed about the
number of units bought and about his own prot.
MonReal Treatment : The supply side is as in the MonSim treatment. On the demand
side, there are four real buyers who can each buy one unit of the good and have an (induced)
monetary valuation for this unit of 24.5, which was publicly known. After the monopolist made his
decision about the price (at which he would be willing to satisfy the demand of up to 4 units of the
good), buyers were informed about this price and then asked to independently and simultaneously
make their purchase decision. At the end of a period, the monopolist was informed about the
number of units bought (without any indication of the identity of buyers who bought or did not
buy a unit) and about own prots. Buyers were informed about their own prot but not about the
number of units sold by the monopolist.
BertSim Treatment : On the demand side, there are four sellers in each market who can
each sell up to four units of the good in the market.8 Sellers were informed about the four simulated
buyers and how these simulated buyers would make their purchase decision given the market price.
7The experiment was administered in German. A complete set of translated instructions can be found in the
Appendix.
8We use four sellers, as Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) found that the Bertrand solution predicts behavior well if
there are three or more rms, whereas two sellers are more prone to collude.
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(Simulated buyers acted as described for the MonSim treatment.) At the beginning of each
period, each of the four sellers was asked to independently and simultaneously choose a price at
which he would be willing to satisfy the demand of up to 4 units of the good. Sellers knew that the
lowest of the four chosen prices would be selected and passed on to buyers who would then make
their purchase decisions. Subjects were informed that in case of more than one seller choosing the
lowest price, the units that would be sold at this price would be equally divided among the sellers
who chose the lowest price. At the end of a period, the sellers were informed about the lowest
chosen price, the own number of units sold, and own prot.9
BertReal Treatment : Regarding sellers (buyers), the setting was as in the BertSim
treatment (MonReal).
Each seller in each of the treatments had production costs of 6.5 points per unit sold in
all periods of the experiment. Additionally, sellers had to pay a unit tax for each unit sold. This
unit tax was equal to 2 points in the rst phase of the experiment (10 periods). This feature was
part of the instructions. In the second phase of the experiment, which also consisted of 10 periods,
this unit tax was increased to 6 points per unit sold. After completion of the rst phase of the
experiment, a window appeared on subjectsscreens informing them that the only change would
be that sellers now had to pay a unit tax of 6 points per unit sold instead of 2 points and that all
other rules would be the same as in the rst phase of the experiment.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the experiment software z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher 2007) and run at the MELESSA lab of the University of Munich. The subjects were
students from more than 40 di¤erent elds of study (112 subjects in total).10 Each subject received
an endowment of 25 points at the beginning of the experiment. This was done to cover possible
losses. Subjects were informed that the sum of their earnings in points during the experiment
plus their initial endowment would be converted into real money at the end of the experiment.
In an e¤ort to balance payments across treatments, we used an exchange rate of points to euros
of, respectively, 200:1 (MonSim treatment), 25:1 (MonReal treatment), and 10:1 (BertSim and
BertReal treatments). Table 1 summarizes basic information about the design.
9Only the lowest price, not the distribution of prices was reported to other players in order to make collusion more
di¢ cult, and, hence, come closer to a framework with perfect competition. Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2002) found
that reporting of higher prices may facilitate collusion.
10The participants were recruited using the software ORSEE (Greiner 2004).
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Simulated Buyers Real (Human) Buyers
Monopoly
MonSim
1 seller, 4 simulated buyers
Number of markets: 10
Number of subjects: 10
MonReal
1 seller, 4 human buyers
Number of markets: 6
Number of subjects: 30 (= 6 5)
Bertrand
BertSim
4 sellers, 4 simulated buyers
Number of markets: 6
Number of subjects: 24 (= 6 4)
BertReal
4 sellers, 4 human buyers
Number of markets: 6
Number of subjects: 48 (= 6 8)
Table 1: Overview of the 2 by 2 factorial design
Related experimental literature. Our analysis builds on a solid stock of knowledge
from the literature on experimental market games, which cannot be surveyed here. Each of our
treatments borrows from these insights, which also means that the setup of most of the respective
experimental markets which we consider has been used in one or several other experiments in the
context of other research questions.
Since sellers in our experiments make take-it-or-leave-it price o¤ers to buyers, results on
experimental posted-o¤er trading institutions are relevant. Monopoly markets using this institution
are known to achieve prices well above competitive levels, but on average, prots are signicantly
below theoretical monopoly levels.(Holt, 1995, p.381). A di¤erence is that, next to the o¤er price,
sellers in posted-o¤er markets typically also indicate the number of units they are willing to sell.
We eliminated this feature in order to come closer to the textbook framework of a price-setting
monopolist. The monopoly game we consider is also structurally related to the ultimatum game.
From this literature (see, e.g., Güth, 1995, or Roth, 1995) it is known that proposers often propose
the equal split, and that the probability of rejection by responders increases as o¤ers decrease.
These results shaped our hypotheses as regards the MonReal treatment.
There is also considerable evidence from experimental Bertrand markets. Experimental
results in homogeneous markets show that while market prices stay above the competitive level in
duopoly, they quickly converge to the competitive level when there are three or more rms in the
market (see, e.g., Fouraker and Siegel, 1963, and Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2002). Also, collusion
among sellers is more di¢ cult if only the lowest posted price is announced. For these reasons,
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we chose four sellers and posted only the lowest o¤er price. Tyran and Engelmann (2005) study
consumer boycotts in a posted-o¤er market.11 They study a market with three human sellers and
ve human buyers and ask whether a referendum among buyers about a boycott can make boycott
a more e¤ective kind of countervailing buyer power. They also study the role of a production cost
increase for the e¤ectiveness of boycott in treatments without a referendum and with a (individually
non-binding) referendum. Although their research question is a completely di¤erent one, their base
treatment (without a referendum) can be seen almost as the blueprint for our BertReal treatment,
except for one di¤erence: their suppliers have the option of withholding or limiting their supply
(at a given price). We turned the suppliers into perfect Bertrand competitors by removing their
option of limiting or withholding supply. This choice removes part of the power to threaten buyers,
moving our market closer to a sequence of independent, perfectly competitive markets.12
Both in monopoly and oligopoly pricing games, the presence of human buyers leads to lower
prices as compared to simulated demand. This has been attributed to actual or threatened demand
withholding by human buyers (see Holt, 1995 or Brown Kruse, 2008 and the references therein.)
Countervailing buyer power may also become an issue with human buyers (see the overview by
Ru­ e 2009). These results provided suggestions for designing our treatments with automated and
human buyers.
The economic e¤ects of taxation in the context of markets is a core question in public
nance. Who bears the burden of a unit sales tax? How does the allocation of this burden between
buyers and sellers depend on the market conditions and the competition between sellers? Why is
it easier for a Bertrand competitor to shift the burden of a tax than for a monopolist? What is
the excess burden of a tax? And how does it depend on the prevailing market conditions? These
questions are addressed in each and every textbook on taxation. Our analysis is to the best of
our knowledge the rst systematic experimental study that considers tax-burden shifting and the
size of the excess burden of taxation as a function of market power.
11See also Ru­ e (2000), Engle-Warnick and Ru­ e (2005) and the survey by Ru­ e (2009) on contervailing buyer
power.
12Despite the wholly di¤erent research question in our paper, our results on Bert-Real also contribute to the
research question in Tyran and Engelmann (2005). They nd a substantial amount of boycott and we basically nd
no boycott. We nd that both prices above marginal cost and boycott tend to disappear in a context without strategic
supply withholding. Higher prices and the boycott behavior in their study may be driven by the assumption about
sellerswithholding power.
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5 Experimental results
We report the results of the experiment in four steps. First, we give a quick overview of the results
by providing and discussing a table with summary statistics. Second, we test Hypotheses 1 and
2 regarding the pass-through of the tax burden from sellers to buyers. Third, for the purpose of
testing Hypotheses 3 and 4, we estimate the demand curve in theMonReal treatment for earlier
periods and check whether, with the help of this estimated demand, pricing behavior of monopolists
can be predicted for laterperiods. Finally, we analyze the excess burden in the treatments with
real buyers.
Overview of the results. We start with Table 2, which compares the equilibrium values
for players who maximize their monetary payo¤s with the average outcomes observed in the ex-
periment. Columns 2-4 show results for the monopoly markets, while columns 5-7 show results for
the Bertrand markets. For each of the two market forms, one column shows the values predicted
by theory while the two columns to the right of it show the results for markets with simulated and
real (human) demand. To purge the data of learning e¤ects at the beginning of sessions, in Table 2
we report results of experienced behavior, i.e., from periods 6-10 of each phase of the experiment.
Let us rst concentrate on prices. With respect to both Bertrand markets, we observe that
the predictions of theory are quite accurately borne out by the data. That is, Bertrand competition
pushes prices down to sellersunit costs. Accordingly, an increase in unit costs increases prices by
the cost increase, and this implies that the sellers can shift the entire tax burden on to the buyers,
which seems to be true in both experimental Bertrand markets.
The outcome for monopoly markets with simulated demand is also largely in line with the
theory prediction. Although rms in the rst phase of the experiment price slightly lower than
in the textbook equilibrium, the average observed price increases only slightly with the tax rate.
However, the outcome in the monopoly case with real demand clearly di¤ers from the textbook
outcome. Indeed, prices are substantially lower than in the textbook equilibrium, buyer boycott
exists, and the monopolist can increase the equilibrium price by about 37% of the tax-induced
increase in production cost. To further illustrate the results in the monopoly treatments, let us
compute the monopoly e¤ectiveness index: M = (a   c)=(m   c), where a is actual prot,
c is prot at the competitive equilibrium and m is monopoly prot calculated as in the textbook
(Holt 1995).13 For experienced behavior in the MonSim treatment, we nd an average M = 0:89
13For this index M = 1 (M = 0) means that the monopolist achieves monopoly (perfectly competitive) prots.
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Monopoly Bertrand
Theory MonSim MonReal Theory BertSim BertReal
Market Price
[tax = 2]
24 22.98
(0.47)
16.43
(0.50)
9 8.97
(0.06)
8.90
(0.06)
Market Price
[tax = 6]
24 23.42
(0.24)
17.9
(0.40)
13 13
(0)
12.97
(0.03)
Di¤erence 0 0.44 1.47 4 4.03 4.07
No. units bought
[tax = 2]
4 3.92
(0.08)
3.03
(0.20)
4 4
(0)
3.83
(0.07)
No. units bought
[tax = 6]
4 4
(0)
3.23
(0.18)
4 4
(0)
3.8
(0.07)
Di¤erence 0 0.08 0.2 0 0  0.03
Avg. total prots rms
[tax = 2]
62 55.4
(1.70)
22.42
(1.69)
2 1.87
(0.23)
1.52
(0.22)
Avg. total prots rms
[tax = 6]
46 43.68
(0.94)
16.68
(1.43)
2 2
(0)
1.77
(0.14)
Di¤erence  16  11.72  5.73 0 0.13 .25
Avg. total prots buyers
[tax = 2]
2 26.12
(2.60)
62 59.82
(1.13)
Avg. total prots buyers
[tax = 6]
2 22.12
(2.02)
46 43.83
(0.88)
Di¤erence 0  4.00  16  15.98
Tax revenue
[tax = 2]
8 6.07
(0.39)
8 7.67
(0.14)
Tax revenue
[tax = 6]
24 19.4
(1.10)
24 22.80
(0.45)
Di¤erence 16 13.33 16 15.13
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (based on market averages). Data from Periods 6-10 of each phase.
Table 2: Summary of experimental results
17
(when t = 2) and M = 0:95 (when t = 6). For experienced behavior in treatmentMonReal, these
numbers are M = 0:34 (when t = 2) and M = 0:33 (when t = 6).14
In the treatments with real buyers, we can calculate the total burden for rms and buyers
that results from the tax increase, and the impact on welfare (as in equations (3), (4), and (5)).
With Bertrand competition, the rmsprots are almost una¤ected by the tax increase whereas
the buyersprots decrease, as predicted by the theory. The decrease in prots, however, is o¤set
by the higher tax revenue. In treatment MonReal, both the prot of the monopolist and the
prots of the buyers decrease when the tax is increased, but the total decrease in prots is smaller
than the additional tax revenue, suggesting that the tax increase generates a welfare gain.
Price-setting in monopoly and Bertrand markets. To test Hypotheses 1 and 2
as well as additional hypotheses in a compact way, we rst run a regression of the form pit =
V ARS + "it, where pit is the market price in market i in period t and "it is the overall error
component. The vector V ARS contains treatment dummies (MonSim, MonReal, BertSim, and
BertReal) and interaction terms of the treatment dummies and the dummy HighTax indicating
the second phase of the experiment when the tax is increased to t = 6. Since we suppress the
constant in the regression equation, the coe¢ cients of the treatment dummies indicate the average
prices in the rst phase of the experiment when the tax is low (t = 2), while the interaction terms
between treatment dummies and the dummy HighTax indicate the average price increase in the
four treatments from the rst phase (when the tax is low) to the second phase of the experiment
(when the tax is high).15 To test the hypotheses, we then perform two-tailed Wald tests.16 The
14For the nal period in the markets reported in Smith (1981), Holt (1995) nds the following numbers: double-
auction monopoly: M = 0:36; posted-bid monopoly: M = 0:15; posted-o¤er monopoly: M = 1:0. Plott (1989)
remarks that the likely reason for the failure of the monopolist in the double auction to exercise market power is the
fact that buyers in this institution do not behave passively as price takers but engage in withholding purchases. This
behavior causes the monopolist to price more cautiously. This explanation is in line with the observations in our
monopoly treatments, where, with human buyers in the Mon-Real treatment, we also observe demand withholding.
15To control for the possible non-independence of prices stemming from the same market, we estimated the re-
gression equation using the cluster option provided by STATAon individual markets. This option does not a¤ect
the estimated coe¢ cients but estimates the standard errors using robust variance matrix calculations that relax the
assumption of independence of errors within each market (cluster). For more details, see STATA Corp. (1999, vol.
3, pp. 156-158 and 178-179), White (1980), and Rogers (1993).
16Test results are the same when we perform t tests on average prices of each individual market.
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results for experienced behavior (periods 6-10 and 16-20) are reported in Table 3.17
The results with respect to the Bertrand markets are most clear-cut. With simulated and
real buyers alike, it cannot be rejected that the tax increase is fully shifted to the consumers:
the coe¢ cients of the interaction terms BertSim*HighTax and BertReal*HighTax are not
signicantly di¤erent from 4 (which is the amount by which the tax increases). Moreover, in the
BertSim treatment, the average price in the rst phase of the experiment does not signicantly
di¤er from 9, as theoretically predicted. This is not the case for treatment BertReal. Note,
however, that the average market price in the rst phase of this treatment is virtually 9. Finally,
a comparison of the estimated price increases from the rst to the second phase of the experiment
across the two Bertrand markets suggests no statistical di¤erence (second-to-last line in Table 3).
We conclude that the two Bertrand markets work very similarly and that hypotheses 1 and 2 on
tax incidence in Bertrand markets are conrmed.
Let us now turn to the monopoly markets. In the MonSim treatment, the interaction
term MonSimHighTax for the second phase (with t = 6) is not signicantly di¤erent from zero,
supporting the hypothesis that monopolists in this treatment bear the full burden of an additional
tax. The average market price in phase 1 of the MonSim treatment is 22:98, and the test result on
this coe¢ cient indicates that the average price is not signicantly di¤erent from 24, as suggested
by theory.
In the MonReal treatment, the average market price (16.43) in phase 1 is signicantly
smaller than 24, and the interaction term with the high-tax dummy for phase 2 is signicantly
di¤erent from zero. This means that, as already discussed earlier, monopolists in the MonReal
treatment are e¤ectively constrained by the presence of real buyers compared to automated demand,
but can pass on some of the higher costs due to the tax increase to buyers. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is
conrmed. Finally, note that it cannot be rejected that the tax shifting is the same across the two
monopoly treatments.
Result 1 With automated demand, there is full tax shifting in the Bertrand markets, but there is
no signicant tax shifting under monopoly.
Result 2 With real buyers, there is full tax shifting with Bertrand price competition and signicant
but incomplete tax shifting under monopoly.
17Using only dummies in the above regression equation, the coe¢ cients of the treatment dummies and the inter-
action e¤ects are equal to the average prices and the di¤erences across phases of the experiment reported in the rst
lines of Table 2. Nevertheless, for convenience we report both the coe¢ cients and the test results in Table 3.
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Estimated equation:
pit = 1BertSim+ 2BertReal+ 3MonSim+ 4MonReal+ 5BertSim HighTax
+6BertReal HighTax+ 7MonSim HighTax+ 8MonReal HighTax+ "it
Estimation results
1 (BertSim) 8.97 (0.078)
2 (BertReal) 8.9 (0.044)
3 (MonSim) 22.98 (0.625)
4 (MonReal) 16.43 (1.057)
5 (BertSimHighTax) 4.03 (0.078)
6 (BertRealHighTax) 4.07 (0.065)
7 (MonSimHighTax) 0.44 (0.693)
8 (MonRealHighTax) 1.47 (0.505)
R2 0.988
N 280
Tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2
H0: 5 = 4 p = 0:6801
H0: 7 = 0 p = 0:5413
H0: 6 = 4 p = 0:3316
H0: 8 = 0 p = 0:0175
Additional Tests
H0: 1 = 9 p = 0:6801
H0: 2 = 9 p = 0:0474
H0: 3 = 24 p = 0:1371
H0: 4 = 24 p < 0:0001
H0: 5 = 6 p = 0:5914
H0: 7 = 8 p = 0:2749
Notes:  signicant at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses. H0 tested by means of two-tailed Wald tests.
Data from Periods 6-10 of each phase (experienced behavior).
Table 3: Test results for price e¤ects
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Demand withholding and optimization in the monopoly case. We now turn to
the outcomes that di¤er most noticeably from the textbook outcome: monopoly with real buyers.
We test the theory according to which monopolists use early periods to nd out about the buyers
demand function, D(p), given the monopolists selling price. For this purpose, we rst estimate the
buying behavior of the averagebuyer by means of a logit function of the form
Pr(buyit) = F (0 + 1pkt + vi + "it); (6)
where buyit is the acceptance decision of subject i in period t (buyit equals 1 if subject i bought a
unit in period t; otherwise it equals 0), pkt is the price set by monopolist k in period t; and F is
the logit function F (x) = 1=(1 + exp(x)): Recall that there are four real (human) buyers in each
market in theMonReal treatment. Hence, we assume that the demand function, D(p); of a typical
monopolist in theMonReal treatment is simply given byD(p) = 4F (p) = 4(1=(1+exp(b0+b1p)));
where b0 and b1 are the estimated parameters in equation (6). Note that estimating equation (6)
models purchasing behavior of the average buyer. We refrain from estimating buyer behavior for
each subject (and aggregating demand per market) for lack of a su¢ cient number of observations
at the individual level.
Having estimated the average demand function in the MonReal treatment using the ob-
servations in periods 1; 2; :::; T   1 by means of equation (6), we then predict the average price
chosen by monopolists in the MonReal treatment in period T as
argmax
p
fD(p)(p  c  t)g
where c = 6:5 is the unit production cost and t 2 f2; 6g is the tax. Moreover, we predict the excess
burden of the tax based on the estimated demand function using the predicted price for period T .
The results are shown in Table 4.
Table 4 should be read row by row. The entry in the rst column indicates the period
for which we want to predict the average price chosen by monopolists (i.e., period T = 10 in
row 2). The entry in the second column indicates the periods we use to estimate the demand
functions monopolists faced in the past (i.e., periods 1; 2; :::; 9 in row 2). The entries in the third
and fourth column show the estimates of the parameters in the demand function (i.e., 0 = 14:98
and 1 =  0:83 in row 2). Finally, the entries in column 5 and 6 report, respectively, the predicted
and the average observed price in period T (i.e., 16.06 and 16.33 in row 2), and column 7 states
the loss of surplus, or excess burden, due to demand withholding, (1 F (p))m(24:5  c), predicted
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Time interval
used for estimation 0 1
Predicted p
in period T
Observed p
in period T
Excess burden
in period T
T = 10 1; 2; :::; T   1 14.98
(2.90)
 0.83
(0.17)
16.06 16.33 11.50
T = 20 11; 12; :::; T   1 34.26
(8.13)
 1.77
(0.43)
17.84 17.83 7.21
T = 9 1; 2; :::; T   1 14.06
(2.92)
 0.78
(0.17)
16.06 16.17 12.26
T = 19 11; 12; :::; T   1 39.86
(9.69)
 2.06
(0.51)
18.17 17.91 6.16
T = 11 1; 2; :::; T   1 12.34
(2.37)
 0.67
(0.14)
16.32 18.00
Note:  signicant at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4: Prediction of the monopoly price in period T based on observed buyer behavior in early
periods (MonReal treatment)
on the basis of the estimated demand. In column 7, the di¤erence between the entries in row 2 and
row 3 (and row 4 and 5, respectively) describes the change in the excess burden, which corresponds
to the welfare e¤ect of the tax increase (see equation (3)).
The sign of the slope of the estimated demand function is given by the sign of the coe¢ cient
1: All estimates of 1 reported in Table 4 are negative and highly signicantly di¤erent from 0.
We conclude that all demand functions reported in Table 4 are downward-sloping and are thus
di¤erent from block demand (Hypothesis 3).
Result 3 With real buyers, the demand curve is downward-sloping.
Next, consider row 2 (row 3), which shows the results concerning the prediction of the
average price chosen in period 10 (period 20) using the information on buyer behavior in periods
1 to 9 (11 to 19). We nd that the estimated average prices are very much on target, conrming
Hypothesis 4. In fact, the predicted price for period 10 is 16.06, while we observe an average price
of 16.33 in this period. Moreover, the predicted price for period 20 is 17.84, while the observed
average price in this period is 17.83. Rows 4 and 5 in Table 4 show the predictions for periods 9
and 19 (using information on buyer behavior in periods 1 to 8 and 11 to 18, respectively). Again,
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the predictions are quite accurate. Perhaps not surprisingly, using the information of periods 1
to 10 (where the tax is equal to 2) to predict the average price chosen in period 11 (where the
tax is increased to 6) clearly fails, as the average observed price is about 1:7 units higher than
the estimated price in period 11. Predicting the expected loss of surplus which is caused by
demand withholding suggests that the excess burden decreases when the tax is increased. Thus,
by weakening demand withholding, the tax increase causes a welfare gain.
Finally, although there is also some demand withholding in the BertReal treatment (see
Table 2), estimations show that the demand function, e.g. for periods 1 to 9, is not downward-
sloping. Summarizing, we can conrm Hypothesis 4:
Result 4 With real buyers, in later periods it appears that the monopolist chooses the price that
maximizes his payo¤, based on observed buying decisions in earlier periods.
E¢ ciency and excess burden. An increase in the tax may actually decrease, increase
or hold constant the expected loss of surplus. To illustrate the e¤ects consider Figure 1. The
solid line AB is meant to describe the relationship between p and F (p) for t = 2, which is the
expected demand per buyer as a function of p. By way of illustration, let this go up linearly from
F (p = 25) = 0 to F (p = 9) = 1. In this case the monopolist chooses the price at which marginal
cost equals marginal revenue, which is true at F (p) = 1=2 and leads to a monopoly price of 17 and
an expected loss of surplus equal to the rectangle CDEF. Now consider t = 6, and assume that the
stochastic demand remains linear, but passes through F (25) = 0 and F (13) = 1, as line AB0. This
rotation around point A can be interpreted as a similar boycott behavior, whereby no customer
is willing to pay above his monetary reservation prize, but all customers are willing to buy if the
monopolist charges only the smallest feasible price that exceeds the tax-inclusive production cost.
In this case the monopoly quantity stays at F (p) = 1=2, inducing exactly the same excess burden
as for t = 2. As suggested by this example, an increase and a decrease in the excess burden are
both feasible if the change in the demand function is slightly di¤erent.
In the following we test for the e¤ect of the tax increase on the monetary payo¤s of rms
and buyers and on the excess burden of the tax increase for the treatments with real (human)
buyers. For this purpose, we estimate equation yit = V ARS + "it; where yit refers to one of these
three measures of the tax burden (payo¤ loss to rms, payo¤ loss to buyers, and excess burden) and
the vector V ARS contains dummies for the BertReal andMonReal treatments and interaction
terms with phase 2 (where t = 6). Hence, as in the price regressions reported above, the interaction
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Figure 1: Monopoly pricing with strategic boycott uncertainty: the e¤ect of a tax increase
terms measure the e¤ect of the tax increase from phase 1 to phase 2 of the experiment.18 The results
are shown in Table 5. The estimation conrms that in the Bertrand markets, the rmsprots are
not signicantly a¤ected by the tax increase, whereas the buyerspayo¤s signicantly decrease (see
the signicance levels on the BertRealHighTax variable). In the monopoly treatment, both
the rms and the buyerspayo¤s decrease when the tax is increased, but only the e¤ect on rms
prots is signicant.
With Bertrand competition, the excess burden is only borderline signicantly di¤erent from
zero (p = 0:096), and it is not a¤ected by the tax increase. There is only weak demand withholding,
as the average number of units bought (about 3:8) is close to the maximum demand of 4 units. In
the monopoly case with real buyers, however, the excess burden is signicantly larger than zero, con-
rming Hypothesis 5. Moreover, it follows from the signicance level of the MonRealHighTax
interaction term that the excess burden does not signicantly change when the tax is increased.
The sign of the coe¢ cient ( 3:60) may suggest that, although there can be countervailing e¤ects of
18As in the price-e¤ect regressions, we control for possible non-independence of observations that stem from the
same market.
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Estimated equation:
yit= 1BertReal+ 2BertReal HighTax+ 3MonReal+ 4MonReal HighTax+ "it
Estimation results Prot of rms Prot of buyers Excess burden
1 (BertReal) 1.52 (0.144) 59.82 (1.430) 3.00 (1.464)
2 (BertRealHighTax) 0.25 (0.255)  15.98 (0.998) 0.60 (1.121)
3 (MonReal) 22.42 (2.280) 26.12 (4.732) 17.40 (3.448)
4 (MonRealHighTax)  5.73 (1.871)  4.00 (2.852)  3.60 (4.104)
R2 0.845 0.947 0.401
N 120 120 120
Note:  signicant at 1%,  signicant at 5%,  signicant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses.
Data from Periods 6-10 of each phase.
Table 5: Results of prot and excess-burden regressions
an increase of the tax, in our case the positive e¤ects on welfare prevail. To summarize, Hypothesis
5 on the excess burden in the regime with real buyers is conrmed by the results shown in Table 5.
Result 5 The Bertrand markets with real buyers are (weakly) e¢ cient. In the case of monopoly
with real buyers, there is a signicantly positive excess burden.
6 Conclusion
The experimental analysis in this paper tested the most salient predictions of public nance theory
about the role of market power for tax incidence.
 We nd that the tax incidence e¤ects in Bertrand markets are an almost perfect mapping of
results in public nance theory: a tax increase is fully shifted to the consumers via higher
prices, where the equilibrium price stays very close to (tax-inclusive) marginal cost. This
holds regardless of whether the buyersdecisions are simulated and deterministic, or whether
buyers are real (human) players. Demand withholding or boycott does not play an important
role. Hence, there was no excess burden in the Bertrand markets we analyzed.
 The experimental results in the case of monopoly with simulated buyers are also fully in line
with tax incidence results for standard monopoly theory. The monopolist bears a major share
in the cost of an increased tax.
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 The presence of real buyers has a signicant and positive impact on prices that could be
predicted from the theory of buyer boycott. Buyers who are real (human) players may refuse
to buy at prices that they consider too high, even if the prices are lower than their monetary
reservation prices. The observed monopoly prices are signicantly below the price predicted
for monopoly in the textbook. Also, the monopolist signicantly increases the market price
as a reaction to the tax increase. Both the monopolist and the buyers share in the tax
burden. The monopoly prices can be seen as prot-maximizing monopoly price choices by
a monopolist who takes the buyers possible boycott behavior into consideration and uses
earlier purchase decisions for the formation of a belief about buyer decisions. In the case of
monopoly with real buyers, demand withholding leads to a welfare loss.
 We identify several theoretical reasons for why an increase in the tax may, but need not,
increase the welfare loss in the monopoly market that is caused by possible boycott behavior.
A tax increase can reduce the welfare loss from monopoly in such a framework. In the
experimental market we nd that the tax increase reduced the welfare loss and had a negative
marginal excess burden.
The experimental analysis of the role of market power for the incidence of a tax was motivated
by a sharp contrast between public perceptions and the predictions of public economic theory. In
the public debate it is frequently argued that market power enables rms to maintain their prot
margin in times of cost increases by passing a cost increase on to the consumers. In a similar vein,
these public perceptions are expressed well by the participants in our experiment. At the end of
the experiment, we asked the participants (among other questions) whether they (rather or fully)
agreed to or (rather or fully) disagreed with the following statement:
A monopolist is much more able to pass an increase in the VAT on to the consumers
than a rm that is competing with many other rms.
Independent of the treatment, more than 50 percent of the participants fully agreed to this state-
ment, and an additional 30 percent rather agreed. These numbers may be considered as surprisingly
strong evidence for these perceptions (particularly given that these persons had just minutes before
participated in one of the experimental sessions that produced the opposite results).
These public perceptions contrast strongly with textbook public nance theory. While
providing a wealth of results for less clear-cut market conditions, textbook public nance makes
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precisely inverse predictions. It suggests that Bertrand competitors can completely shift the tax
burden, whereas a monopolist cannot; it also o¤ers a strong intuition for this result. Most of our
experimental results contradict the widely held perceptions and are fully in line with the textbook
intuition in public nance. This is true in particular if rms could rmly rely on (automated)
demand choices determined purely by buyersmonetary rewards. If (human) buyers make purchase
decisions, this causes strategic uncertainty. This e¤ect could not a¤ect the incidence results for
Bertrand markets, but it changes the tax incidence of monopoly markets and brings the incidence
outcomes closer to public perceptions; it places the monopolist rm in a position in which it may
shift part of the tax on to buyers.
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Instructions for the MonReal treatment
Welcome to this experiment!
General Information
 Please read these instructions carefully and completely.
 Please do not talk to your neighbors and keep quiet during the entire experiment.
 Raise your hand if you have a question. One of us will come to you.
 All participants in the experiment have been given the same instructions.
Introduction
 In this experiment you will repeatedly make decisions. By doing so you can earn money.
 Your gains are measured in Talers. How much you earn depends on your decisions and the
decision of other participants.
 At the beginning of the experiment, each participant will receive an initial endowment of 25
Talers.
 At the end of the experiment your total sum of Talers will be determined by the sum of the
initial endowment plus the number of Talers you earned in each round.
 At the end of the experiment you will receive 1 euro in cash for every 25 Talers. In addition,
each participant will receive a participation fee of 4 euros.
 During the entire experiment, anonymity among participants and instructors will be kept.
 The experiment consists of two parts, each of which consists of 10 rounds. The rules for the
rst part will be explained now. The rules for the second part will be given after completion
of the rst part of the experiment.
Description of the experiment
 In this experiment you will act in a market in which there are sellers on one side and buyers
on the other side of the market. In the following we will describe both sides of the market.
Sellers
 Sellers represent rms that manufacture and sell a product in this market.
 Each seller may sell up to four units of the product on the market. The production cost per
unit sold is 6.50 Talers. In addition, each seller has to pay a tax of 2 Talers for each unit sold.
 In every round, each seller chooses the price at which he/she wishes to sell the product. This
price must be a non-negative integer (0, 1, 2, 3 ...). By opting for this price, the seller declares
that he/she wishes to sell up to four units of the product at this price.
 The sellers prot per round is calculated by the di¤erence between the sales revenue and the
cost:
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Sellers prot = sales revenue - cost
 The sales revenue is equal to the chosen price multiplied by the number of units sold:
Sales revenue = price  number of units sold
 The costs incurred are equal to the sum of production costs and tax per unit sold multiplied
by the number of units sold:
Cost = (cost of production per unit + tax per unit)  number of units sold
= (6.50 + 2)  number of units sold
= 8.50  number of units sold
 So:
Sellers prot
= (sales revenue) - (cost)
= (price  number of units sold) (8.50  number of units sold)
= (price - 8.50)  number of units sold.
 Please note that a seller will make a loss if he sells the units at a price lower than the total
sum of the costs and tax per unit (i.e., 8.50 Talers).
 There will be exactly one seller in each market. At the beginning of the experiment, one
participant will be randomly assigned to a market as the seller and will remain as seller in
this market in all rounds of the two parts of the experiment.
 At the beginning of each round, the seller of a market will choose a selling price. The price
will be presented to the buyers, who then have to decide whether or not to buy at this price.
The seller can sell the units (up to four) on the market.
Buyers
 Each buyer can buy exactly one unit on the market. The value of a unit bought is 24.50
Talers for each buyer. (The value is determined by the fact that the laboratory pays exactly
this price to the buyers for each unit bought.)
 If a buyer purchases one unit of the product, the buyers prot per round is the di¤erence
between the unit value and the purchase price:
Buyers prot = value - price = 24.50 - price
 There will be four buyers in each market. This means, the maximum demand in a market is
four units.
 At the beginning of the experiment, four participants will be randomly assigned as buyers
and will then remain as buyers in this market in all rounds of the two parts of the experiment.
 Once the seller has chosen a selling price at the beginning of a round, this price will be
presented to the buyers. The buyers then have to decide whether or not to buy at this price.
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 If a buyer does not want to buy a unit at that price, he or she may press the push-button
specifying Do not Buy.
 If a buyer wants to buy a unit at that price, he or she can press the push-button indicating
Buy at this price.
Please note that a buyer will make a loss if he/she buys a unit at a price that is higher
than the value of a unit (i.e. higher than 24.50 Talers).
Sequence of actions in the experiment
 Each market consists of one seller (who can sell up to four units of the product) and four
buyers (who can each purchase one unit). At the beginning of the experiment participants
will be informed as to whether they are a seller or a buyer. The rst phase of the experiment
consists of 10 rounds. The sequence of a round in the rst phase is as follows:
 At the beginning of each round, the seller of a market chooses a price at which he/she is
obligated, depending on the demand, to sell four units. For this purpose, the seller chooses a
non-negative integer (0, 1, 2, 3...) as a price, and conrms this by pressing the OKbutton.
 The price chosen by the seller will then be displayed to the buyers. Each buyer then has to
independently decide whether or not to buy a unit of the product at the given price.
 To summarize the information in each round, the computer will then reveal the following
information:
 Seller: own chosen price, the number of own units sold and own prot.
Buyer: Lowest price chosen and the own prot.
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Instructions for the MonSim treatment
Welcome to this experiment!
General Information
 Please read these instructions carefully and completely.
 Please do not talk to your neighbors and keep quiet during the entire experiment.
 Raise your hand if you have a question. One of us will come to you.
 All participants in the experiment have been given the same instructions.
Introduction
 In this experiment you will repeatedly make decisions. By doing so you can earn money.
 Your gains are measured in Talers. How much you earn depends on your decisions.
 At the beginning of the experiment, each participant will receive an initial endowment of 25
Talers.
 At the end of the experiment your total sum of Talers will be determined by the sum of the
initial endowment and the number of Talers you have earned in each round.
 At the end of the experiment you will receive 1 euro in cash for every 200 Talers. In addition,
each participant will receive a participation fee of 4 euros.
 During the entire experiment, anonymity among participants and instructors will be kept.
 The experiment consists of two parts, each of which consists of 10 rounds. The rules for the
rst part will be explained now. The rules for the second part will be given after completion
of the rst part of the experiment.
Description of the experiment
 In this experiment you will act in a market in which there are sellers on one side and buyers
on the other side of the market. In the following we will describe both sides of the market.
Sellers
 Sellers represent rms that manufacture and sell a product in this market.
 Each seller may sell up to four units of the product on the market. The production cost per
unit sold is 6.50 Talers. In addition, each seller has to pay a tax of 2 Talers for each unit sold.
 In every round, each seller chooses the price at which he/she wishes to sell the product. This
price must be a non-negative integer (0, 1, 2, 3 ...). By opting for this price, the seller declares
that he/she wishes to sell up to four units of the product at this price.
 The sellers prot per round is calculated by the di¤erence between the sales revenue and the
cost:
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Sellers prot = sales revenue - cost
 The sales revenue is equal to the chosen price multiplied by the number of units sold:
Sales revenue = price  number of units sold
 The costs incurred are equal to the sum of production costs and tax per unit sold multiplied
by the number of units sold:
Cost = (cost of production per unit + tax per unit)  number of units sold
= (6.50 + 2)  number of units sold
= 8.50  number of units sold
 So:
Sellers prot
= (sales revenue) - (cost)
= (price  number of units sold) (8.50  number of units sold)
= (price - 8.50)  number of units sold.
 Please note that a seller will make a loss if he/she sells the units at a price lower than the
total sum of the costs and tax per unit (i.e., 8.50 Talers).
 There will be exactly one seller in each market. At the beginning of the experiment, one
participant will be randomly assigned to a market as the seller and will remain as seller in
this market in all rounds of the two parts of the experiment.
 At the beginning of each round, the seller of a market will choose a selling price. The price
will be presented to the buyers, who then have to decide whether or not to buy at this price.
The seller can sell the units (up to four) on the market.
Buyers
 Each buyer can buy exactly one unit on the market. The value of a unit bought is 24.50
Talers for each buyer. (The value is determined by the fact that the laboratory pays exactly
this price to the buyers for each unit bought.)
 If a buyer purchases one unit of the product, the buyers prot per round is the di¤erence
between the unit value and the purchase price:
Buyers prot = value - price = 24.50 - price
 There will be four buyers in each market. This means, the maximum demand in a market is
four units.
 There are no real buyers in this experiment. Instead, the buyers in all rounds of the two parts
of the experiment are simulated by the computer. There are four computer-simulated buyers.
 Once the seller has chosen a selling price at the beginning of a round, this price will be
presented to the simulated buyers. The simulated buyers then have to decide whether or not
to buy at this price.
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None of the simulated buyers will purchase a unit of the product if the price is higher
than the 24.50 value of a unit.
Each of the four simulated buyers will purchase one unit of the product at a price that
is less than or equal to the 24.50 value of a unit.
Sequence of actions in the experiment
 Each market consists of one seller (who can sell up to four units of the product) and four
simulated buyers (who can each purchase one unit). The rst phase of the experiment consists
of 10 rounds. The sequence of a round in the rst phase is as follows:
 At the beginning of each round, the seller of a market chooses a price at which he/she is
obligated, depending on the demand, to sell four units. For this purpose, the seller chooses a
non-negative integer (0, 1, 2, 3...) as a price, and conrms this by pressing the OKbutton.
 The price chosen by the seller will then be displayed to the buyers. Each buyer then has to
independently decide whether or not to buy a unit of the product at the given price.
 To summarize the information in each round, the computer will then reveal the following
information:
Chosen price, the number of units sold, and own prot.
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Instructions for the BertReal treatment
Welcome to this experiment!
General Information
 Please read these instructions carefully and completely.
 Please do not talk to your neighbors and keep quiet during the entire experiment.
 Raise your hand if you have a question. One of us will come to you.
 All participants in the experiment have been given the same instructions.
Introduction
 In this experiment you will repeatedly make decisions. By doing so you can earn money.
 Your gains are measured in Talers. How much you earn depends on your decisions and the
decision of other participants.
 At the beginning of the experiment, each participant will receive an initial endowment of 25
Talers.
 At the end of the experiment your total sum of Talers will be determined by the sum of the
initial endowment plus the number of Talers you have earned in each round.
 At the end of the experiment you will receive 1 euro in cash for every 25 Talers. In addition,
each participant will receive a participation fee of 4 euros.
 During the entire experiment, anonymity among participants and instructors will be kept.
 The experiment consists of two parts, each of which consists of 10 rounds. The rules for the
rst part will be explained now. The rules for the second part will be given after completion
of the rst part of the experiment.
Description of the experiment
 In this experiment you will act in a market in which there are sellers on one side and buyers
on the other side of the market. In the following we will describe both sides of the market.
Sellers
 Sellers represent rms that manufacture and sell a product in this market.
 Each seller may sell up to four units of the product on the market. The production cost per
unit sold is 6.50 Talers. In addition, each seller has to pay a tax of 2 Talers for each unit sold.
 In every round, each seller chooses the price at which he/she wishes to sell the product. This
price must be a non-negative integer (0, 1, 2, 3 ...). By opting for this price, the seller declares
that he/she wishes to sell up to four units of the product at this price.
 The sellers prot per round is calculated by the di¤erence between the sales revenue and the
cost:
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Sellers prot = sales revenue - cost
 The sales revenue is equal to the chosen price multiplied by the number of units sold:
Sales revenue = price  number of units sold
 The costs incurred are equal to the sum of production costs and tax per unit sold multiplied
by the number of units sold:
Cost = (cost of production per unit + tax per unit)  number of units sold
= (6.50 + 2)  number of units sold
= 8.50  number of units sold
 So:
Sellers prot
= (sales revenue) - (cost)
= (price  number of units sold) (8.50  number of units sold)
= (price - 8.50)  number of units sold.
 Please note that a seller will make a loss if he/she sells the units at a price lower than the
total sum of the costs and tax per unit (i.e., 8.50 Talers).
 There will be four sellers in each market. At the beginning of the experiment, four participants
will be randomly assigned to a market as sellers, and these sellers will remain as sellers in
this market in all rounds of the two parts of the experiment.
 At the beginning of each round, all the sellers of a market will simultaneously and indepen-
dently choose a selling price. The prices are then recorded and compared. Only the lowest
of the prices chosen by the sellers will be presented to the buyers, who then have to decide
whether or not to buy at this price. This means that only the seller with the lowest price can
sell his units (up to four) on the market. If more than one seller chooses this lowest price, the
units to be sold will be evenly divided between these sellers.
Buyers
 Each buyer can buy exactly one unit on the market. The value of a unit bought is 24.50
Talers for each buyer. (The value is determined by the fact that the laboratory pays exactly
this price to the buyers for each unit bought.)
 If a buyer purchases one unit of the product, the buyers prot per round is the di¤erence
between the unit value and the purchase price:
Buyers prot = value - price = 24.50 - price
 There will be four buyers in each market. This means, the maximum demand in a market is
four units.
 At the beginning of the experiment, four participants will be randomly assigned as buyers
and will then remain buyers in this market in all rounds of the two parts of the experiment.
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 Once the sellers have simultaneously and independently chosen their selling price at the
beginning of a round, the lowest of the four prices will be selected and presented to the
buyers. The buyers then have to decide whether or not to buy at this price.
 If a buyer does not want to buy a unit at that price, he or she may press the push-button
specifying Do not Buy.
 If a buyer wants to buy a unit at that price, he or she can press the push-button indicating
Buy at this price.
Please note that a buyer will make a loss if he/she buys a unit at a price that is higher
than the value of a unit (i.e. higher than 24.50 Talers).
Sequence of actions in the experiment
 Each market consists of four sellers (who can each sell up to four units of the product) and four
buyers (who can each purchase one unit). At the beginning of the experiment participants
will be informed as to whether they are a seller or a buyer. The rst phase of the experiment
consists of 10 rounds. The sequence of a round in the rst phase is as follows:
 At the beginning of each round, the sellers of a market independently choose a price at which
they are obligated, depending on the demand, to sell four units. For this purpose, each seller
chooses a non-negative integer (0, 1, 2, 3...) as a price, and conrms this by pressing the
OKbutton.
 The lowest of the prices chosen by the sellers will then be displayed to the buyers. Each buyer
then has to independently decide whether or not to buy a unit of the product at the given
price.
 To summarize the information in each round, the computer will then reveal the following
information:
 Seller: own chosen price, the lowest price chosen, the number of own units sold and the
own prot.
Buyer: Lowest price chosen and own prot.
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Instructions for the BertSim treatment
Welcome to this experiment!
General Information
 Please read these instructions carefully and completely.
 Please do not talk to your neighbors and keep quiet during the entire experiment.
 Raise your hand if you have a question. One of us will come to you.
 All participants in the experiment have been given the same instructions.
Introduction
 In this experiment you will repeatedly make decisions. By doing so you can earn money.
 Your gains are measured in Talers. How much you earn depends on your decisions and the
decision of other participants.
 At the beginning of the experiment, each participant will receive an initial endowment of 25
Talers.
 At the end of the experiment your total sum of Talers will be determined by the sum of the
initial endowment plus the number of Talers you have earned in each round.
 At the end of the experiment you will receive 1 euro in cash for every 10 Talers. In addition,
each participant will receive a participation fee of 4 euros.
 During the entire experiment, anonymity among participants and instructors will be kept.
 The experiment consists of two parts, each of which consists of 10 rounds. The rules for the
rst part will be explained now. The rules for the second part will be given after completion
of the rst part of the experiment.
Description of the experiment
 In this experiment you will act in a market in which there are sellers on one side and buyers
on the other side of the market. In the following we will describe both sides of the market.
Sellers
 Sellers represent rms that manufacture and sell a product in this market. Each seller may
sell up to four units of the product on the market. The production cost per unit sold is 6.50
Talers. In addition, each seller has to pay a tax of 2 Talers for each unit sold.
 In every round, each seller chooses the price at which he/she wishes to sell the product. This
price must be a non-negative integer (0, 1, 2, 3 ...). By opting for this price, the seller declares
that he/she wishes to sell up to four units of the product at this price.
 The sellers prot per round is calculated by the di¤erence between the sales revenue and the
cost:
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Sellers prot = sales revenue - cost
 The sales revenue is equal to the chosen price multiplied by the number of units sold:
Sales revenue = price  number of units sold
 The costs incurred are equal to the sum of production costs and tax per unit sold multiplied
by the number of units sold:
Cost = (cost of production per unit + tax per unit)  number of units sold
= (6.50 + 2)  number of units sold
= 8.50  number of units sold
 So:
Sellers prot
= (sales revenue) - (cost)
= (price  number of units sold) (8.50  number of units sold)
= (price - 8.50)  number of units sold.
 Please note that a seller will make a loss if he sells the units at a price lower than the total
sum of the costs and tax per unit (i.e., 8.50 Talers).
 There will be exactly four sellers in each market. At the beginning of the experiment, four
participants will be randomly assigned to a market as sellers, and these sellers will remain as
sellers in this market in all rounds of the two parts of the experiment.
 At the beginning of each round, all the sellers of a market will simultaneously and indepen-
dently choose a selling price. The prices are then recorded and compared. Only the lowest
of the prices chosen by the sellers will be presented to the buyers, who then have to decide
whether or not to buy at this price. This means that only the seller with the lowest price can
sell his units (up to four) on the market. If more than one seller chooses this lowest price, the
units to be sold will be evenly divided between these sellers.
Buyers
 Each buyer can buy exactly one unit on the market. The value of a unit bought is 24.50
Talers for each buyer. (The value is determined by the fact that the laboratory pays exactly
this price to the buyers for each unit bought.)
 If a buyer purchases one unit of the product, the buyers prot per round is the di¤erence
between the unit value and the purchase price:
Buyers prot = value - price = 24.50 - price
 There will be four buyers in each market. This means, the maximum demand in a market is
four units.
 There are no real buyers in this experiment. Instead, the buyers in all rounds of the two parts
of the experiment are simulated by the computer. There are four computer-simulated buyers.
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 Once the sellers have simultaneously and independently chosen their selling price at the
beginning of a round, the lowest of the four prices will be selected and presented to the
buyers. The simulated buyers then have to decide whether or not to buy at this price.
None of the simulated buyers will purchase a unit of the product if the price is higher
than the 24.50 value of a unit.
Each of the four simulated buyers will purchase one unit of the product at a price that
is less than or equal to the 24.50 value of a unit.
Sequence of actions in the experiment
 Each market consists of four sellers (who can each sell up to four units of the product) and
four simulated buyers (who can each purchase one unit). The rst phase of the experiment
consists of 10 rounds. The sequence of a round in the rst phase is as follows:
 At the beginning of each round, the sellers of a market independently choose a price at which
they are obligated, depending on the demand, to sell four units. For this purpose, each seller
chooses a non-negative integer (0, 1, 2, 3...) as a price, and conrms this by pressing the
OKbutton.
 The lowest of the prices chosen by the sellers will then be displayed to the buyers. Each buyer
then has to independently decide whether or not to buy a unit of the product at the given
price.
 To summarize the information in each round, the computer will then reveal the following
information:
Own chosen price, the lowest price chosen, the number of own units sold and own prot.
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